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MILITARISM

IN SOVIET - COMMUNIST

SOCIETY

Selected Readings.

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A. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF COMMUNIST MILITARISM

From: Monnerot, Jules. Sociology and Psychology of Communism.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. (French original 1949)

Rome, The Totalitarian Prototype. (pp. 27-29)

"In the Roman world it was in the structure of the army that a solution was found for the problem set by the Senate's failure. And in the 20th century we find that the communist Campaign, and also its fascist and national-socialist imitators, have modelled themselves upon the structure of the army. They have borrowed some of its characteristic and typical features: discipline, subordination, hierarchy, concerted exercises and methods, unity of command. But it was not sufficient to pour the proletariat into the existing mould of the army, as in the Roman world, and this was not what was done. The problem was to replace the army (and the police, who can be taken as a specialised branch of it) by another army. And this new army was to wage a new type of war. It was to operate in time of peace and to wage, in time of war, its own separate war, not against the enemy but against its own government; it was not intended for open campaigns or for attacking fortified positions, but for undermining a social order. Such an organisation, which ignores the definitions by which an army is traditionally described, namely the distinctions between war and peace, between military and civilian, cannot properly be described as an army. The traditional army exists to defend a collectivity both offensively and defensively; it is for use only in time of war (martial law, which treats certain kinds of internal trouble as equivalent to foreign war, is an exceptional case); and lastly, and above all, it restricts itself to the use of recognised weapons (or at least this has been the case in all wars except the last one). Dynastic Europe acknowledged the rules of war, and they were observed between European countries up to the first world war; that is, until the introduction of submarines and poison gas and the device of sheltering behind the bodies of enemy civilians. From these symptoms it should already have been possible to predict, during the war of 1914, the birth of totalitarian methods. From then onwards the expression 'scientific barbarism' stood for something that Europeans could recognise by experience. The traditional army did, of course, employ spies in its intelligence service; but military decisions had to be taken openly, by men dressed in conventional uniforms which distinguished them from civilians and from enemy soldiers.

"The organisation known as the Party (we shall refer again to the ambiguity of this word, which stands for a new political fact while still retaining its old meaning) is an army which admits no conventions whatsoever in common between itself and its opponents. Since it represents a partition of the human race into two camps, the word 'party' is etymologically quite appropriate. Such a party, or its general staff,

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has no use for declarations of war, nor even for any discrimination between the state of war and the state of peace. The mere existence of the Party reveals or implies a state of war which can only end with the final destruction of all pre-existing social structures--and this is the sole purpose of the Party's existence.

"The war waged by an army of this type, specially adapted to 20th-century conditions, is very much more 'total' than the totalitarian warfare of Ludendorff's studies, because it is not confined to periods of military operations. It cannot conceivably stop short of the conquest of the entire planet. It is a Protean war, of unlimited duration. It is not an affair of rivalries between empires, and although the essential war may project itself, as psycho-analysts put it, in the forms of imperialist war, these forms do not reveal its meaning. The purpose is to rid the world of all rivals and rule alone. The 20th-century communist army does not absorb the proletariat as the Roman army did, but it does, like the Roman army, have leaders who are working to build a new Imperium. And within the new type of army called the Party the conventional army--the army of the state or of the super-state when once it has been subdued and organised--will be merely a specialised military subsection for dealing with any wars of the traditional kind that may at times be superimposed upon the permanent Campaign.

"This new historical reality, whose meaning exceeds the connotation of such words as Army, Campaign, and Party, was developed in theory before it became a fact; and theory helped to make it a fact. Indeed, we can see today that a certain theory was the chief promontory symptom of the event itself."

Bolshevik Militarism. (pp. 85-87)

"These figures [on the bolshevik party] seem to make the days of the 'clandestine circle' and the 'military organisation' of professional revolutionaries look very remote. But not at all. All that has happened is that the meanings of words have changed. The party, the Russian State, and the International are still controlled by a handful of men. The supreme staff (the real one) is no larger than it was under Lenin. In 1904 Trotsky made his famous 'anti-bolshevik' sally; 'According to Lenin's plan, the working class is replaced by the party; the party is replaced by the party organisation; the party organisation is replaced by the Central Committee; and finally the Central Committee is replaced by the dictator.' (Nashi Politicheskie Zadachi, p.54). This gives a better account than the figures we have just cited of what really happened after 1917. Indeed, it gives an explanation of the figures themselves. It is within the party itself that we must now look to find the true statistical relation between the organisation of professional revolutionaries and the working class and then the 'labouring masses'. To the new member who

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has no special recommendations the party membership card gives a chance of obtaining work and lodging, but nothing more. There is a plebs within the party. The structure has not really changed. Witness Stalin himself; 'Three or four thousand men of the high command--the generals of our party. Then 30 to 40 thousand intermediate commanders; these constitute the officer corps of our party. And a further 100 to 150 thousand of the leading elements of our party--these are, so to speak, the subaltern officers of our party.' Quoting these words, Dallin justly comments: 'Of the 30 to 40 thousand party directors...fully one half are scattered throughout distant provinces....They have no part in the formation of party opinion. Only about 10,000 to 15,000...constitute the real party.' (David J. Dallin, The Real Soviet Russia, New Haven, 1944, p.226--our italics.) It is clear that in spite of appearances the numbers have hardly changed since the beginning. The general staff constantly endeavours to counteract the effects of the executions, deportations, and purges inherent in the régime by recruiting new elites as revealed in productive work and, later, in war, and by supervising and encouraging them. It was decided in 1934 that no party candidate should be accepted unless he had 'taken courses in political education and was grounded in the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism' (Kaganovich); but Stalin had this clause abrogated, and it no longer appears in the statutes of the party as modified in 1939.

"The 'spontaneous disappearance' of the International (or Comintern) in 1943 made no difference at all. Russian history can be distinguished from Western history by the fact that in Russia every initiative comes from above; and what distinguishes Tsarism from the post-revolutionary régime in Russia is that the former was only able to carry out imperfectly its desire to circumscribe and penetrate and control and inspire every social activity, whereas the latter achieves this objective more completely.

"The government had to fight against the vestigial remnants of the old régime and to keep on guard against the malevolence of the capitalist world; it also aimed to industrialise at record-breaking speed an immense country, with vast natural resources, most of whose population had remained hitherto quite untouched by modern industrial civilisation; and these activities all tended towards the same goal as the theory expounded by Lenin in What is to be Done? --namely a gigantic, centralised, hierarchical, pyramidal apparatus whose purpose would be to establish over 'one-sixth of the earth's surface' (to begin with) a state that might be described as a sort of modern Sparta, industrial, warlike, and bureaucratic.

"And just as the evolution of Western capitalism produced new middle classes (as is now well known, Marx did not foresee this phenomenon) in place of those it disrupted or destroyed, so the conditions of post-revolutionary Russian capitalism, in the form of State capitalism, have produced new middle classes who resemble their analogues in the private industries of the West in being classes of officials and employees. But

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as distinguished from those of private Western capitalism, the Russian bureaucracy is uniform and hierarchial. In contrast with the new uniform and hierarchical chin [ranks], the conditions and ways of life to be found among the new middle classes of Western capitalism seem to be heterogeneous and varied (though only by comparison with Russia). Differences in standards of life are more obvious to the naked eye in Russia, and the expression 'industrial army' is literally true. There is no distinction, as in the West, between workers in private industry and State employees; there are only State officials, and these officials are integrated into a system which cannot well be compared to anything except an army. The bolshevik elite, the hard nucleus of the Marxist intelligentsia, was obliged to undertake the militarisation of 'cadres' drawn from the plebs in order to effect a frontal attack upon, and real occupation of, the State power; but the achievement of power merely necessitated a further militarisation on a larger scale, though masked this time by the new and less heroic conditions. Nevertheless, the tone of the propaganda for the five-year plans remained militaristic, and it compared to a series of battles those plans of 'socialist construction' which the unbeliever calls the industrialisation of Russia."

B. MILITARISM IN THE SOVIET SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Communist society is organized along military lines because, to Lenin, the most effective form of organization is military organization:

"Let us take a modern army, here is a good example of organization. This organization is good simply because it is flexible, because it knows how to impart a single will to millions of people.

"Today, these millions sit in various homes at the different ends of the country. Tomorrow a mobilization order is issued and they gather at appointed places. Today, they lie in trenches sometimes for months at a stretch. Tomorrow, in a prearranged order, they march forward to storm the enemy. Today, they perform miracles in evading bullets and shrapnel. Tomorrow, they perform miracles in open battles. Today, their advance posts lay mines under the ground; tomorrow, they cover dozens of miles in accordance with instructions from flyers in the air.

"That is what you call organization, when in the name of one object, inspired by a single will, millions of people change the form of their intercourse and their action, the place and methods of their activity, their weapons and arms, in accordance with the changing circumstances and demands of the struggle."

(Quoted in F. Brown, "Lenin's Conception of the Party," The Communist, January, 1934).

An army demands that at its convenience a soldier's entire life be subordinated to military aims. Therefore, so long as the Party permits the individual civilian freedom to order the "nonpolitical" sectors of his life, there is loss of manipulability. The following describes the peacetime atmosphere of the war-minded Communist Empire:

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"Apparently, the entire nation approaches the obligations of military preparation under the psychological stimulus of the threat of war. Large, well-equipped standing armed forces are maintained in a high degree of readiness. Adequate reserves are at hand for swift mobilization to full military strength. The educational system indoctrinates the youth with the need for sacrifice and discipline, and gives them the elements of military training. Finally, the entire population is conscious of the importance of military preparedness and is trained to make a maximum contribution in time of war. The Soviet Union probably is as prepared to change to a war status as human compulsion can make it."

(Soviet Power and Policy, ed. by G. B. de Huszar, NY, Crowell, 1955, p. 274.)

In attempting to answer the question "How did Soviet Russia win World War II with an industry half-ruined by the enemy within the first six months of the War," a specialist made an intensive survey of Soviet legislation, publications, etc., etc. over a period of 23 years; the analysis resulted in the clear demonstration that Soviet Russia--and all Communist societies--are, ipso facto, militaristic in nature. This specialist, Ellsworth Lester Raymond, in his doctoral dissertation "Soviet Preparation for Total War, 1925-1951," (University of Michigan, 1951, pp. ii-x, 19-23), states:

"It is devoted to one major reason for Soviet victory that has been generally overlooked: The fact that the USSR has been preparing its economy and civilian life for total war ever since the mid-1920's. My dissertation is an endeavor to describe this total preparation for war, its origins, motives, forms, methods and development....precise details of this preparation are extremely difficult to find...because on the one hand it would be poor propaganda for socialism which is professedly pacifist, and on the other, is suppressed by strict military secrecy laws existing since the 1920's.

....
"The dissertation is a study of the organized rear supporting the army, of war industry proper, and the mobilization of economy and civilian life for military needs.... Since the mid-1920's, when the preparedness program of the youthful War Minister Mikhail Frunze was adopted, the Soviet Union has made total preparations in peacetime for the expected future total war....Also, this war preparation is not past history alone. The same molding of civilian life for war continues at full speed today, though naturally improved by lessons learned in wartime. This peacetime total militarization of the Soviet Union is very real..."

Because of the perennial desire on the part of the Soviets to pose as the Champions of Peace, the very great development of Soviet war industry is closely and successfully concealed not only from the outside world's information media but from free-world tourists and from diplomats in the USSR as well. Raymond, who was a research analyst at the US Embassy in Russia for six years, describes what he was permitted to observe only because, at the beginning of the Battle of Moscow during World War II, his office was evacuated to Kuibyshev, one of the largest cities of the Soviet Union. In spite of its population of over half a million:

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"....Life was slow, quiet and drab in Kuibyshev...To all appearance, there was no war effort in Kuibyshev.

"A short trip outside the town explained matters only too well. Several miles from Kuibyshev's outskirts stood a second city almost as large as the town itself, but consisting of nothing but factories. This was Nameless, a city of smokestacks, where big factories stood side by side like houses. Seven of these plants made airplane parts and assembled planes, forming a giant conveyor belt not of machines but factories. US Air Transport Command aviators, who had visited every British and American battle-front in the world, had never seen so many military planes together as at the Nameless airport...The largest anti-aircraft searchlight factory in Russia was there, and a huge ammunition plant too...

"The dull drab city of Kuibyshev, where nothing seemed to happen, was actually the greatest center of aircraft manufacture in Russia, and one of the world's largest producers of military equipment. This sleepy residential city was simply one giant dormitory for the many thousands of workers who trekked every day on foot or by ailing trolley to the Nameless factories. Nor was Nameless a purely wartime creation. Some of the huge industrial plants were evacuees from the West, but many had been built near Kuibyshev before Hitler invaded Russia.

"This glaring contrast between a slow backward city and its huge modern factories is a common sight in the land of the Soviets...During the thirteen long years of prewar industrialization, 1928-1941, the USSR sacrificed the comforts of life to build up a huge heavy industry. Before the war, many visitors to Russia believed it militarily weak, because they saw the backward residential districts, not the factories. Such tourists did not realize that Russian life is poor mostly because the USSR Government deliberately holds down the standard of living.

Early Tendencies Toward Total Mobilization

"After being eye-witnesses of the Russian civilian collapse in both World War I and the Civil War, it is hardly surprising to find the Communists mobilizing the rear for war even before total militarization became their official policy in 1925. During the Civil War itself, besides the ...labor, housing, weapons, communication and commodity mobilizations, much was done to bring mass civilian organizations into the war effort. In 1919, second year of Civil War, the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party decreed: 'All workers and semi-workers must have very extensive military training, and the pertinent military subjects must be introduced in the schools.' (1) Almost simultaneously, the Army Political Administration was organized as a dual military-civilian office, permanently becoming both a branch of the War Commissariat and a section of the Communist Party's all-powerful Central Committee. Though

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this hybrid's chief concern is morale and party propaganda in the regular Red Army, from 1922 it also took control of political training of 'pre-conscripts'--youths soon to become soldiers under annual military conscription. (2)

"At the end of the Civil War, the Ninth Communist Party Congress ordered no less than the Office of Education, all trade unions, sport societies, party organizations and the Young Communist League to aid pre-army military training of these "pre-conscripts". (3) By 1922, the Fifth Congress of the Young Communist League, or self-styled 'Komsomol', commanded its local societies to prepare youths for the army by describing military life and tasks through the press, lectures and study circles. The same year, the Komsomol became the 'patron' of the Red Navy, which mostly meant filling warship crews with loyal Young Communists to prevent another dangerous naval mutiny like the 1921 Kronstadt rebellion at Leningrad, Russia's second largest city. (4)

"Not to be outdone, the Red Army had its 'patrons' too--the Teachers' and Artists' unions, who from 1923 arranged lectures, shows and excursions for professional soldiers, and gave them cultured books and magazines to read. (5)

"Besides drafting already existent civilian organizations to aid the armed forces, early Soviet Russia took the trouble to form two militarized home-guard societies. In 1923, the 'Friends of the Air Force' incorporated, and held Russia's first glider races in the lush subtropical Crimea. The next year, the 'Friends of Gas Defense' came into being, and by Soviet law not only private citizens could be members, but even government factories and offices. (6)

"The governmental bureaucracy itself was made more militaristic the third year after the Civil War. Meeting in 1923, the Twelfth Communist Party Congress decreed that 'the USSR budget, state investments, security measures and all governmental activity must concentrate on planned expansion of state industry, and thus improve armament production.' (7) A year later, the Red Army General Staff was completely reorganized, relieved of administrative drudgery, and assigned entirely to war planning--including not just military mobilization, but economic and political preparedness too. In the same 1924, a 'Central Mobilization Commission for Auto Transport' was organized in the War Commissariat, and local commissions throughout the USSR in the military districts and armies. Though under military chairmanship, these committees always included representatives from civilian transportation offices. (8)

"Nor should fast Soviet successes be overlooked in military and civil aviation, whose colossal war role was understood by the Bolsheviks even in the early 1920s. Beginning in 1921, the first year of peace after the Civil War, the half-built Tsarist aircraft factories were repaired,

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finished, and put into operation. In 1922, Russia imported nine out of every ten of its new warplanes, in 1923--only half, and by 1925--none. The Red Air Force more than doubled--expanding from 300 planes in 1920 to 700 in 1925. (9) As early as 1923, Russia was fourth in the world in number of civilian and army airplanes, yielding only to France, England and the U.S.A. (10).

"Deruluft," a joint Soviet-German company, in 1922 opened Russia's first airline-- Moscow to Konigsberg, East Prussia. Next year, the first all-Russian airway started operating within the USSR, under close military supervision by the 'Civil Aviation Council' of the War Commissariat. (11)"

1. A. Geronimus and V. Orlov, The USSR Communist Party and Military Matters, Moscow, Military Herald Press, 1928, p. 68.
- 2, 3. Geronimus, ibid, pp. 80, 85, 297.
4. Vice-Admiral P. Abankin, "Beloved Child of the Soviet People," Izvestia, July 27, 1947.
- 5, 6. M. V. Frunze, Collected Works, Moscow, State Press, 1926-1929, Vol. 2, pp. 61 and 299; Vol. 3, p. 384.
"Art Workers' Appeal," Izvestia, Jan. 27, 1938.
Small Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. 7, 1938, pp. 817-818.
Collection of Decrees, Resolutions, Edicts and Orders on National Economy, Moscow, Economic Life Press, 1924, p. 176.
7. Geronimus, op cit., p. 98.
- 8, 9. Frunze, op cit., Vol. 2, pp. 31-32; Vol. 3, pp. 158-162, 217, 239.
Collection of Laws and Edicts of the USSR Government, Vol. 1, No. 13, Oct. 17, 1924.
A. Loktionov/Chief of the Red Air Force/, "Stalinist Aviation," Izvestia, Aug. 18, 1938.
10. World Aviation Annual, Washington, Aviation Research Institute, 1948, p. 499.
11. I. Unshlikht, "Civil Aviation on the Threshold of the Second Year of the Second Five-Year Plan," Planned Economy, No. 1, 1934.
Collection of Laws and Edicts of the USSR Government, Vol. 1, No. 64, Nov. 26, 1927.

Pokrovsky, People, and the (War) Economy

In 1956 Major General Georgiy I. Pokrovsky (described by U. S. military specialist Raymond L. Garthoff as a "most authoritative Soviet scientist and military man") propounded the desirable and necessary--from the Soviet point of view--relationship between the structure of society and production for war. See Pokrovsky's Science and Technology in Contemporary War (translated and annotated by Garthoff), New York, Praeger, 1959 (originally published in Moscow, 1956).

In his introduction (pp. 4-5, 7) Pokrovsky candidly attributes the victory of Rome over the wealthy Carthage to the former's slaveholding economy:

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"In the initial period of the struggle between ancient Rome and ancient Carthage, for example, the Carthaginians had a significant advantage over the Romans because the Carthaginian army was better equipped....Carthage was at that time (i.e., at the beginning of the third century B.C.) the wealthiest and most powerful state in the Mediterranean, while Rome was an agrarian country, economically backward and possessed of neither an advanced technology nor a strong navy.

"However, Rome's slaveholding economy, which was then in a stage of expansion, enabled the country to develop its economy and its technology; and, as a result, Rome was able to create a more perfect navy and to equip its army with more powerful weapons than were those possessed by the Carthaginians. This was the crucial factor which influenced the strategy and the tactics of the conflict, and it was one which gave to Rome a decisive victory (in 149-146 B.C.) over its enemy."

Several pages later Pokrovsky explains that the subjection of the people and their production to military affairs is and always has been integral to Marxist theory:

"The productive forces of society exert an enormous influence on military affairs. In the last analysis this influence is actually decisive. Yet, always, such an influence can be achieved only through the relationship of the people involved in a nation's productivity--i.e., through the structure of the society and the state. Thus, in stressing the decisive influence of the means of production on military affairs, the founders of Marxism did not conceive of this influence in a purely technological light. They always connected the influence of the means of production on military affairs with definite productivity relationships of people and with definite types of armies and weapons. In revealing the relationship and the interconnection of politics and of economics--and of war and politics--the founders of Marxism accorded an enormously important role to the masses of the people."

The Role of the "Whole Population" in Defense

According to Pokrovsky (pp.165-166) contemporary military affairs require, apart from the army and the navy, the participation of the vast majority of the workers in the defense of the country, including technical people, engineers, and scientists. Each soldier is fully prepared for combat only when the many people working in industry, agriculture, transport, and in scientific laboratories have contributed toward his combat training and his armament.

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"....under contemporary conditions, a mass army depending on the whole population is more important to the defense capability of the country than ever before. And, in this connection, the socialist system has, in principle, tremendous advantages over the capitalist social structure.

The Military Education of "Every Level of the Population"

"In order that the army and the population may be best able to insure the defense of their socialist state, it is necessary that they know the missions and aims of the war which they fight and that they have the necessary knowledge of military affairs. The technological military acuteness of every level of the population is now the undeniable foundation of our national defense and of our preparation against any unexpected events. Under these conditions, the dissemination of military knowledge is an important factor of defense work, and it deserves broad development and research."

C. THE BIRTH OF SOVIET MILITARISM

Mikhail Frunze, 1885-1925

After nearly losing the Civil War, the Bolsheviks had the task of preserving their hard-earned peace. Lenin and Stalin lacked the military genius to create an entirely new war plan. Thus it was that General Mikhail Frunze of the Red Army convinced his government to throw all Russia into permanent total mobilization. According to Ellsworth L. Raymond (Ph.D. dissertation, "Soviet Preparation for Total War, 1925-1951," University of Michigan, 1951, pp. 26-40) Frunze's theories are being studied and practiced today, although he is barely mentioned in Soviet history books:

"Mikhail Frunze, the man who militarized Russia, was a most unusual character to be found among early Communist leaders. In a political party of professional pacifists who hated war and all army traditions, he took pains to train himself thoroughly in modern military science long before the revolution....At college, he became interested and involved in student radical movements, and in 1904 quit school to join Lenin's Russian Bolshevik Party.

"From then till the Communists seized power in 1917, he lived the hectic life of a typical underground revolutionist: spreading subversive propaganda, creating party cells, staging strikes, arrest, imprisonment, exile to cold Siberia and escape.....

"But Frunze was a studious soul, and to make himself more useful for the future revolution, wanted to become a specialist in street fighting.... By the time the Bolshevik Revolution exploded in 1917, he was familiar with most military literature of his day, knew far more strategy and tactics than ever needed for petty street fighting, and was a skilled though self-taught scientist of war.

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"....But with the start of the Civil War, opportunities to use his military talent came thick and fast, and he soon was a high-ranking Soviet field general....

"Now a man of experience as well as learning, Frunze began to use his vast fund of military knowledge to plan more wars. On January 30, 1921, just two months after the Civil War... Frunze published a strong article demanding total USSR mobilization. Today a historic document studied by most Red Army officers, this article first appeared in the magazine Communist, and bore the academic title: 'A Uniform Military Doctrine.'

"....he advised the USSR to abandon its hit-or-miss practice of military improvisation, and adopt clear-cut plans involving all Russia's huge civilian population. This would turn the land of Communism into an armed camp, but unlike most Bolsheviks, Frunze saw no glaring contradiction between Marxism and militarism....In his eyes, nothing was wrong about training most civilians for war, because Communism is a movement of the masses and should be mass defended....

"In 1925, Lenin died, Stalin seized control of the Communist party machine ruling Russia, and Frunze won official favor--a promotion from Commander of Soviet armies in the Ukraine to Assistant War and Navy Commissar under Trotsky. Early next year, Trotsky was accused of gross incompetence and dismissed as Commissar, Frunze cheerfully taking his place.

"....he was War Commissar barely nine months... But just before his premature death at the age of 40, Frunze had the warm satisfaction of seeing his total militarization plan made Soviet law....

"...Frunze authored many fine speeches and articles during 1921-1925 to present his preparedness program. Even on the eve of the Soviet-German war two decades later, his 'Teachers to the Aid of the Red Army,' 'National Defense and the Young Communist League,' 'War Industry is the Basis of our Defense Ability' and 'Give Us Equipment' were recommended reading for USSR Communist party members. (1) Best of all articles was 'The Front and Rear in Future War,' which Frunze wrote in 1924... Key passages from this modern military classic read:

'....Under modern circumstances, the task of preparing our country for defense far exceeds the present possibilities of the army and War Office alone. This task must become the business of the whole country, and entire state apparatus....

'In general all work of the Education Commissariat must be so organized that it fully considers and serves defense needs. Its militarization is necessary at all stages and in all branches.

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'A fear of such "militarism" may possibly appear among some teachers...The deep contradiction of principles between the nature of the Soviet Union and the remaining bourgeois capitalist world must sooner or later take the form of open decisive conflict....And therefore our task is to prepare firmly, consistently and unwaveringly for this fight, and make ready the prerequisites for our victory...

'Another immediate task must be to include a minimum course of military knowledge and military training in the programs of elementary and grammar schools...

'....We are starting to develop the manufacture of tractors. As is known, the tractor must play a very great role on future battlefields. Besides the "tanks," all know the caterpillar tractor has wide usage in other military fields too... to achieve that the types of tractors used for peaceful purposes simultaneously satisfy set minimum military specifications, is a fully possible and necessary matter.

'Telecommunications and transportation play a particularly important role during military operations. Basically, all mobilization and preparatory work in this field lie outside the War Office's sphere of operation....All this must be prepared during the process of normal peacetime work by suitable commissariats....links must be established and organizationally consolidated between the said commissariats and the suitable departments and administrative sections of the War Office. The latter must become mobilization instruction staffs for the former.

'Such "militarization" is fully possible, but with two obligatory prerequisites: first, clear realization by the rear--and primarily by the civilian apparatus--of their role in future war and the need of preparing for war ahead of time, and second, establishment of direct links between the military apparatus and the civilian apparatus. This bond must be organized by putting army representatives into civilian organs and institutions adaptable to military specialties.

'....All of our economic managers cannot be required to have the military training and knowledge that would automatically guarantee fulfillment of these demands...The War Office must influence the character and direction of the work of economic organizations with the aid of definite organizational forms of apparatus work, and through various public societies (Friends of the Air Force, Friends of Gas Defense, Military Science Society, etc.).' (2)"

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1. I. Blakhanov, "Frunze and USSR Defense," Bolshevik, No.19-20, Oct.1940.
2. Frunze, Collected Works, Party Press, Moscow, 1934, Vol. 2, pp.96-106.

D. INTERNATIONAL WORDS VS. DOMESTIC DEEDS

As Ellsworth L. Raymond points out in his doctoral dissertation ("Soviet Preparation for Total War, 1925-1951," University of Michigan, 1951, pp.312-316):

"Then there is the unpleasant fact that the USSR offers peace with one hand, but arms with the other. The record speaks for itself."

- 1923: Treaty of friendship, non-aggression and neutrality with Turkey.
(vs.) Law ordering all industry to be organized in peacetime to satisfy wartime needs,
Military departments formed in civilian engineering colleges,
Navy expansion begins.
- 1926: Non-aggression pact with Germany,
Non-aggression treaty with Afghanistan,
Non-aggression treaty with Lithuania.
(vs.) Law listing economic data as military secrets,
All USSR government organizations ordered to help the Defense Aid Society.
- 1927: Treaty of guarantee and neutrality with Iran.
(vs.) Law ordering mobilization reserves of defense supplies to be created,
Mobilization offices established in all government ministries and some factories,
Civil defense rifle ranges established in all regional capitals and some district capitals.
- 1929: Protocol with Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Rumania renouncing war.
(vs.) Law ordering First Five-Year Plan to strengthen economic war potential,
USSR invades Manchuria.
- 1931: USSR proposes economic non-aggression pact to League of Nations' Commission for study of an European Union,
Treaty of non-aggression with Afghanistan.
(vs.) "Ready for Labor and Defense" tests introduced for organized sport,
Tank manufacture begins.

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- 1932: Treaty of Non-aggression with Finland,
Non-aggression pact with Latvia,
Treaty of non-aggression with Estonia,
Non-aggression treaty with Poland,
Non-aggression pact with France.
(vs.) Pacific navy formed,
Mass submarine building begins.
- 1933: USSR, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia sign convention defining aggression,
Convention with Lithuania defining Aggression,
Treaty of non-aggression with Italy.
(vs.) Mass parachuting began as a Soviet sport,
First parachute towers erected,
Arctic navy formed.
- 1934: USSR proposes that Geneva Disarmament Conference continue as a permanent organ for preservation of security against aggression,
USSR joins League of Nations,
Non-aggression pacts renewed with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
(vs.) Red Army expansion begins,
Civil aviation personnel put under martial law.
- 1935: Mutual assistance pact with France,
Mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia,
Renewal of non-aggression treaty with Turkey.
(vs.) Reserve officer training made compulsory for men and women college students,
One-half of USSR machine tools are made by defense factories.
- 1936: Non-aggression pact with Afghanistan renewed,
USSR among nine signatories of Montreux Convention.
(vs.) Defense Industry Ministry formed,
Law planning war mobilization of peasant carts.
- 1937: USSR-British naval limitation agreement,
Non-aggression pact with China.
(vs.) Navy Ministry formed.
- 1939: Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact.
(vs.) Elementary military training made compulsory for boy and girl students in all upper grade and high schools; Aviation Industry, Shipbuilding, Ammunition and Armament Ministries formed,
Military sections created in republic, regional and city Communist Party and Komsomol organizations.

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Internal Posture on Offensive War: Post-War

"Finally, the war for which postwar USSR is preparing is not defensive, but offensive. Of 30 articles in five typical postwar issues of Military Thought, magazine of the USSR Armed Forces Ministry, 11 discussed offense and none spoke of defense. These sample articles are quite authoritative, over half being written by generals and admirals. Their picture of future war is grim: Hostilities begin with mass airraids by bombers, against which large fighter forces are thrown. Strategic bombing will inflict substantial damage on enemy economic potential. Airborne troops and air transport are used on a much larger scale than in World War II. But joint operations of army, navy and air force will win, not aviation alone. Tanks are used in larger numbers and larger groups than in World War II. V-2 rockets with a range of several hundred miles will play a tremendous role. Rockets with 7-25 miles' range largely replace conventional artillery, whose main task will be repelling tanks. Military operations will be more mobile and cover larger areas than in World War II, due to widespread use of jet planes, air transport, motorized and mechanized troops, and rocket artillery. Attacks are launched not by masses of infantry, but by masses of tanks, artillery and planes, all closely coordinated.* Thus, Soviet military men view future war as a modern mechanized offensive by an army on wings and wheels."

* Military Thought, May-Sept., 1946.

E. A MOBILIZED SOCIETY

The military reasoning behind the highly organized aspects of Soviet society was set out in detailed fashion by Ellsworth L. Raymond in his dissertation, "Soviet Preparation for Total War, 1925-1951" (University of Michigan, 1951).

The Power of Organization. (p. 197)

"Far from being a group of mere intellectual Marxists, the USSR Communist Party today is a band of tough professional organizers, who know how to get things done. Nothing could be more foolish than to think that Communism's sole weapons are shrewd propaganda and brute force. Equally important is the power of organization, which Communists wield with great genius. One good reason for the stability of the Soviet regime is that Russia politically is the best organized country on earth. The list of Soviet organizations is almost endless: collective farms, state farms, handicraft and consumer cooperatives, government enterprises, trade unions, sport societies, Young Communist League for youths, Pioneers for children, Octobrists for tiny tots, to say nothing of the army, police armies, and police. Almost every man, woman and child in the USSR is enmeshed in one or more organizations, all of which are interlocked under tight state control. If a Soviet citizen feels rebellious, there is not much he can do. For no individual can fight a chain of powerful organizations.

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"The same Communist technique is put to good use in war preparation. Soviet industry and civilian life are labyrinthed by an intricate mobilization system so complex that one can find neither beginning nor end.But it is clear that good mobilization makes weak countries strong, and is the cheapest form of war preparation. Witness the World-War II record of well-mobilized Japan, an industrial midget, fighting hard for four years before being defeated by that industrial giant, our United States!"

The Permanent Strategic Factor.

Writing circa forty years ago the militarizer of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Frunze, stressed the importance of civilian mobilization, and his views were quoted as authority towards the end of World War II. (See L. Gatovski, "The Industrial Basis of the USSR's Military Power," Bolshevik, No. 17-18, Sept. 1944, cited by Raymond on p. 199):

"The issue of the struggle will be decided by the participation in it of the entire mass of the population, of the entire country, and of the entire state as a whole, and decisively requires strain by all production forces of a country."

During the late 1920's--and again in peacetime--USSR military economic writers made recommendations. The most specific of these were made by G. Shigalin, in his Preparation of Industry for War (Moscow, State Press, Dept. of Milit. Lit., 1928, pp. 227-228). All of the following recommendations (quoted by Raymond on p. 202) were adopted by the Soviet Government during the 1930's:

"Besides the accumulation of untouchable reserves, the basic measures to prepare mobilization of industry for our country's defense needs must be:

Establishment of a definite production program for each enterprise brought into defense work in wartime;

Compilation of factory mobilization plans and a general mobilization plan for industry;

Training of a definite personnel of skilled workers needed for production connected with the manufacture of combat supplies;

Conduct of trial mobilizations in individual industrial enterprises; ...Organization of military work-shops at individual civilian enterprises for manufactures of primary importance to the army and navy...

The forms of administration of mobilized industry in wartime must, if possible, not change the apparatus created in peacetime for administering industry."

Huge Industrial Mobilization Network. (p. 204)

"To put all these mobilization ideas into practice, the Soviet Government created a vast network of military offices, which attached themselves

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to almost every major economic organization. This marriage of army and industry began in the late 1920's, and by the late 1930's embraced the entire government and economic system from top to bottom.

"At the peak of the mobilization pyramid stood the USSR State Planning Commission.../its Mobilization Department/subdivided into three sections: Mobilization Plan for National Economy, Defense Industry Plan, and Plan for the Ministries of Defense (army-navy) and Internal Affairs (police).... the USSR Planning Commission's table of organization also included a Special (war) Chemistry Section. In addition, the Planning Commissions of constituent republics like the Ukraine had their own republic Mobilization Sections.

"Below these top-level planning organizations, almost every non-military ministry had its own military offices and units. Best organized for war was civilian heavy industry, which...was ruled by nine Ministries...At the end of the 1930's, every one of these nine Ministries had Military Sections, Anti-Aircraft Defense Sections, and Militarized Guards...Since 1928 /the Militarized Guards/ and their families were made a privileged class by being given the same educational, farming, housing, land and tax benefits as members of the regular Red Army..."

Military Sections in Factories. (p. 206)

"Since the chief work of Military Sections is mobilization planning, one might expect to find them in ministerial main and branch offices. But they too formed an integral part of the larger heavy industry factories. A refugee Red Army general once described for me the functions of these factory Military Sections:

'They are staffed with Red Army officers, often military engineers, though not necessarily so. These officers draw up plans for the plant's conversion to war production. If the factory manufactures something for the armed forces in peacetime, the Military Section acts as the army's inspectors and buyers of these products. Then the officers listen secretly to workers' conversations, and report to the Defense Ministry whether or not the factory employees are willing to go to war. Finally, the Section has one very great power: it decides who in the factory shall be draft exempt in case of war.'

"Added information came from another personal friend, formerly chief engineer of a Soviet heavy industry plant:

'Even in peacetime, production orders from the army came to us through the factory Military Section. These military orders had such high priority, that the whole plant would stop all other work to fulfill them.' "

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Secret Codes, Secret Accounting in Mobilization. (p. 208)

"Besides Military Sections, Anti-Aircraft Defense Sections and Militarized Guards, in the late 1930's the Ministries for General Machinebuilding, Heavy Machinebuilding and Medium Machinebuilding also had their own secret codes. (Collection of Laws and Edicts of the USSR Government, Vol. I, Nos. 28, 40, 41 respectively 13 May, 11 & 15 July, 1939.) Here again was a clever war preparation, since machinebuilding is the most convertible of all branches of heavy industry. If a machinebuilding ministry received a military production task in peacetime, the order could be forwarded to the proper factory to be filled, and no one outside the ministry and factory would know what was happening....

"The Railway Ministry had its Mobilization Section, and so did each individual railway. All rail lines were guarded by the so-called Rear Militia, which like heavy industry's Militarized Guards could be court-martialed for neglect of duty. The two water-shipping Ministries, River Transport and Merchant Marine, both had Military Sections, Anti-Aircraft Defense Sections, and Militarized Guards, just like heavy industry. On a lower level, each of the many steamship companies under these two ministries had its own Mobilization Group. Likewise a Mobilization Group existed in every seaport. Besides all these, the Merchant Marine Ministry had a Secret Accounting Unit... As for the independent Chief Administration of the Arctic Sea Route, it possessed both Mobilization Sections and Secret Codes.

"All Republic Highway Administrations of the Ministry for Internal Affairs had Mobilization Sections too. Then a 1936 law forced all state farms and collective farms to form defense reserves of horsecarts and harness. Every 50 collective farm households had to provide one cart for the army when needed. (I.A. Akulov, 'Speech to...the 7th Central Executive Committee,' Izvestia, Jan. 26, 1936.) Thus by 1940, the Red Army had 384,000 carts on call at collective farms alone. To complete the communications picture, the Radio, Telephone, Telegraph and Postal Ministry possessed both anti-Aircraft Defense Sections and secret codes.

"The Movie Industry Committee had a special assistant-chief heading its Mobilization Section....Finally, besides the military cart reserve, agriculture also had its Mobilization Sections in the Ministry for State Farms. (Collection of Laws and Edicts of the USSR Government, Vol. I., No. 4, 23 Mar 38.)"

Other Civilian Mobilization Units were created by the Politburo during the 1930's via the integration of military units into many civilian governmental organizations such as Foreign Trade, Public Health, Surveying and Cartography, Hydro-Meteorological Services, etc. Notable among these was the Internal Trade Ministry which in 1935 took over the Military Cooperatives (then under the Central

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Union of Consumers Cooperatives); by 1938 the newly-named "Central Union of Commercial Enterprises Serving the Red Army and Navy" had been converted into a Chief Administration. Raymond states (p. 212):

"Here again was a defense preparation of great value. By operating post exchanges and other military stores in peacetime, the Internal Trade Ministry gained vast experience in supplying food, clothing and other consumer goods to the armed forces, simultaneously relieving the Quartermaster Corps of much army housekeeping drudgery."

Finance Militarized... (p. 213)

"Finance too did not escape mobilization. Besides secret codes, the Finance Ministry possessed an Inspection Service for Military Expenditures, and a Defense Finance Section operating under special instructions confirmed by the Minister of Finance himself. The Soviet Control Commission, which watched financial operations of government organizations to prevent waste, also had a Military Inspection Group. Meanwhile the USSR State Bank contained a Defense Industry Credit Administration."

Justice Militarized... (p. 213)

"Justice was one of the most highly militarized of all state functions. The Office of the USSR Chief Prosecutor (Soviet equivalent of the US Attorney General) had a subdivision: the Office of the Chief Military Prosecutor of the USSR. A Military Collegium constituted part of the USSR Supreme Court. Besides a Mobilization Section and Secret codes, the Justice Ministry had a Section for Military Tribunals (Courts Martial). This wedding of military and civilian courts is because courts martial of the USSR armed forces have the power, even in peacetime, to try any civilian case of arson, assassination, espionage or treason. (Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR, 1917-1947, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, p. 300.)"

F. POST-WAR SOVIET MILITARY PREPARATIONS

From: Ellsworth L. Raymond, "Soviet Preparation for Total War, 1925-1951." (Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1951, pp. 291-295.)

"During the long agony of World War II, many US officials believed that post-war USSR would never return to its prewar Spartan economy. In their opinion, Axis defeat would remove fear of war, so Russia need no longer arm. Soviet industry could become socialist in deed as well as name, and produce for the people instead of Mars. Though this may seem naive, I heard many Russians in wartime USSR say the same."

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Warlike Fourth Five-Year Plan of 1946-1950.

Raymond points out that the illusions shared on both sides of the Iron Curtain were shattered in the spring of 1946 when, just as before, top planning priority went to heavy industry. By 1950 heavy industry was to increase a huge 60 percent over pre-war 1940--while the 1950 quotas for output of consumer goods were to amount to, e.g., 1 pair of shoes, 3 pairs of stockings or socks, less than 1 yard of wool cloth, 3 dishes, less than 1 drinking glass, and \$1.30 worth of furniture for every person of the USSR's giant population.

"As in the past, most emphasis was placed on machine-building, which was to double its pre-war production, and grow from one-third of all industry to one-half....Since all these machinery industries could convert to munitions manufacture, this meant that standby capacities of 20 to 50 percent would be available for armament production.

"A vast one-sixth of all USSR industrial output in 1950 was planned to be military equipment, not counting...quartermaster supplies. This was about the same proportion as in pre-war 1940, when Russia was feverishly arming against Hitler. But postwar total industry would be larger than pre-war, so 1950 arms output was to increase proportionately to two-fifths over 1940. Thus the Plan worked toward one of its major goals: 'to assure further improvement of the USSR's capability for defense, and saturation of the Soviet Union's armed forces with the latest military equipment.' Shipbuilding was to double its pre-war size, 'to assure USSR construction of a strong and mighty navy.'"

For every ruble allocated to repairing war damage--of, e.g., the dwellings of 25 million Soviet citizens--two rubles were to be spent on uninvaded regions--mostly for the construction of new heavy industry in the Urals and Siberia (safe remote areas, far from frontiers).

Post-war Reconversion.

"America, who had never been bombed or invaded, began reconverting with VE-Day and finished before the end of 1945. Russia, which suffered more war damage than any other country, deliberately planned not to reconvert till 1946. After four years of slim rations and tremendous property destruction, the USSR should have turned swords into plowshares as fast as possible. Yet regardless of human suffering, Stalin wished to be militarily strong in the postwar world. Here was a perfect example of Communism's enslavement of economics by politics. While America disarmed, the land of socialism created an immense stockpile of the best weapons World War II could invent...

"USSR tank industry was the first to go civilian... The Mortar Armament Ministry delayed its reconversion till February 1946... Large-scale shell, bomb and mine output lasted several months longer, the Ammunitions Ministry not converting to output of farm machinery till April 1946. (P. Pigolkin,

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"Agricultural Machinebuilding is Solving New Tasks," Izvestia, April 21, 1946.) Even though partial change of production occurred before the final reconversion, the USSR of late 1945 and early 1946 must have stockpiled at least 7,000 tanks, 40,000 mortars, and 110 million shells, bombs and mines of the latest wartime design. Of course, even after these industrial shifts, three munitions-making Ministries still remained: Armament, Aviation Industry, and Shipbuilding. And, as if to combat this trend toward peace, the Soviet Government during 1946 created three new military-economic ministries: Food Reserves, Material Reserves, and Construction of Military and Naval Enterprises. (Izvestia, Mar. 21 and Oct. 20, 1946)."

Postwar Rewards for Military Designers, Etc.

Raymond states that during the late 1930's Soviet scientists and technicians were showered with rewards for research and development of new types of munitions. This situation was repeated (see pp. 297-298) after World War II:

"Even after the delayed 1945 reconversion, Soviet emphasis on armament remained great. Of the ten Stalin first prizes awarded in 1948 for outstanding technological inventions during 1947, five went to munition designers for creating four new types of combat planes and a new cannon. In 1949, two of the three first prizes for research in physics honored cosmic ray and atomic nucleus studies. During the same year, one of the two first prizes for technical research was for investigation of jet airplane motors. Of eight first prizes for inventions, two were for new guns and two more for other arms. Among 1949 second prizes for inventions, one was awarded for naval gun parts, three for ammunition, and six for armaments. Likewise, 1950 prizes for scientific research and inventions included one for artillery, another for naval equipment, six for armaments, seven for aircraft, and 13 for unspecified military equipment." *

* "USSR," Americana Annual, 1949 (p. 680), 1950 (p. 683), 1951 (p. 683).

G. THE FUTURE: MILITARISM, MOBILIZATION AND WORLD WAR THREE

Quotations from: Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image of Future War, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1959, pp. 26-107.

Soviet Image of Future War (...Unchanged):

"Victory in war will now be achieved by means of determined armed struggle, by means of dealing the enemy blows mounting in strength, and the organization for that purpose of all the forces of the people and all the resources of the country."

(Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'--International Life, No. 2, Feb. 1958, pp. 21-22.),

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"The principle of the permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of modern wars, profoundly worked out by Comrade Stalin, is the key to a genuinely scientific materialistic understanding and use of the objective laws of war. This Stalinist thesis arms the Soviet people, its armed forces, with a clear and really scientific understanding of the necessary conditions which in case of war, will secure victory over the enemy."

(Marshal A. Vasilevsky, "J. V. Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR," Pravda, Mar. 9, 1953).

"The enormous significance, not only theoretical but practical also, of the thesis on the permanently-operating factors in war consists in the fact that it shows on which main tasks the strength of the combatant state must be concentrated in order to secure victory in war....In order to convert the potentiality for victory into reality, it is necessary not only to know the objective laws of war, but also to be able to apply them."

(Col. A. Piatkin, "Some Questions of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of War," Voennaya mysl'--Military Thought, No. 3, Mar. 1954, p. 70).

"The socialist system of economy...gives our state an enormous superiority over any capitalist state in relation to the economic and morale potential of the country and to its utilization to achieve victory in war."

(Col. I. N. Levanov, in Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii--Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, May 20, 1957, pp. 212-3).

"It is necessary to underline that in the complex conditions of future war, with the employment of new powerful weapons, the moral-political and moral-combat qualities of the troops and the people in the cause of winning victory over the enemy will have still great significance."

(Col. A. Piatkin, Voennaya mysl'--Military Thought, No. 3, Mar. 1954, p. 21. NB: this judgment was repeated frequently in the following five years).

The Soviet Man and the (Unquestioned) World War III:

"It is true that the third world war to a much greater degree than the first or the second world wars will be a war of machines, a war of motors, a war of electronics, radio and radar technology, and automatic devices. It is true that a future war will to a significant degree be an atomic-hydrogen war, and perhaps a chemical and bacteriological one, too. It is true that a contemporary war is a war of the physical, chemical and biological sciences, of the technical sciences, of science in general, but it is also true that a third world war like all past wars but to a still greater degree will be first and foremost a war of man. His role will not only not diminish, but will become even more significant.

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The Soviet Economy and WW III:

"...The history of war teaches that only those states pass the test of war which prove themselves to be stronger than the opponent in the development and organization of their economy. Moreover, in this is included one of the basic laws determining victory in contemporary war, which is fundamentally an economic war, a war of factories and plants, of transportation and power systems, of scientific research institutes and technical laboratories.

Civilian Morale and WW III:

"...A future war will demand from all categories of personnel of the armed forces and from the entire population an unprecedented exertion of its strength, moral as well as physical. One cannot count on success in it without having already in peacetime a high morale potential, the level of which is determined above all by the social-economic and political system of the country, the political content and aims of the war being fought by it, the attitude toward it of the popular masses.

"...Thus, a primary condition of victory in a future war is the presence of a strong, morally-firm rear without which is unthinkable the supplying of the front with the work of the rear...That is why a future war can only intensify demands for an obligatory accounting of the morale-political potentialities both of one's own country and of the opponent's country.

"...contemporary war is not confined to armed conflict alone. At present, war embraces in a single complex the armed struggle (at the front and in the rear), and the economic, technical, scientific, morale, political, psychological, diplomatic war, etc., that is, a war of the whole country with all its material and spiritual resources.

"....We conclude with that with which we began this article. The basic law of contemporary war, formulated by Lenin, states that war is now conducted by the peoples.

"...The millions of toilers, the masses, are the true creators not only of civil history but also of military history....And this means that a third world war cannot but lead to the defeat of the imperialist states, to the complete and final fall of capitalism as a whole."

(Col. I. Baz, "Soviet Military Science on the Character of Contemporary War," Voennyi vestnik--Military Herald--chief Soviet Army journal, No. 6, Jun. 1958).

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H. ECONOMIC MILITARIZATION

From: George Bernard de Huszar and Associates. Soviet Power and Policy.
New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955, pp. 91-103

Unbalancing Industry for War.

"The first planned abnormality of Soviet industry is that the development of its heavy industry, producing capital goods, has been, and continues to be, given much greater emphasis than its light industry, manufacturing consumer goods. Stalin's own explanation for this industrial perversion was given in his election campaign speech during February, 1946:

'It would be a mistake to think such a historic victory could have been won if the whole country had not prepared beforehand for active defense. It would be no less mistaken to imagine that such preparations could be carried through in a short time--in the space of some three or four years. It would be a still greater mistake to say that we won only owing to the gallantry of our troops.

'....To meet the blow of such an enemy, to repulse him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him required, in addition to the matchless gallantry of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments and adequate quantities of them as well as well-organized supplies in sufficient quantities.

'But that, in turn, necessitated having--and in adequate amounts--such elementary things as metal for the manufacture of armaments, equipment and machinery for factories, fuel to keep the factories and transport going, cotton for the manufacture of uniforms, and grain for supplying the Army.

'Can it be claimed that before entering the Second World War our country already commanded the necessary material potentialities for satisfying all these requirements in the main? I think it can. In order to prepare for this tremendous job we had to carry out three Five-Year Plans of national economic development. It was precisely these three Five-Year Plans that helped us to create these material potentialities.....

'By what policy did the Communist Party succeed in providing these material potentialities in the country in such a short time?

'First of all, by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.

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'The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries industrialization usually begins with light industry....

'But that is a lengthy process requiring an extensive period of several decades, in the course of which these countries have to wait until industry has developed and must make a shift without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party could not take this course. The Party knew that a war was looming, that the country could not be defended without heavy industry, that the development of heavy industry must be undertaken as soon as possible, that to be behind with this would mean to lose. The Party remembered Lenin's words to the effect that without heavy industry it would be impossible to uphold the country's independence, that without it the Soviet order might perish.

'Accordingly, the Communist Party...began work of industrializing the country by developing heavy industry....A valuable aid in this work was the nationalization of industry and banking, which made possible the rapid accumulation and transfer of funds to heavy industry...

' Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities thus created in order to develop war production and provide the Red Army with the weapons it needed?

'...the Party scored such successes as allowed it not only to furnish the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine guns, rifles, aircraft, tanks and ammunition, but to accumulate reserves.'

"Thus Russia deliberately gave priority to heavy industry instead of consumer-goods production...Hence, a huge seven tenths of all Soviet industry is heavy industry--a higher proportion than in any other country in today's world.

The Example of Alloy Steel Production

"Oversize heavy industry might seem enough of an industrial unbalance, but the Soviet government has gone even further and created additional disproportions within heavy industry itself. One of the best examples of this policy is the unusually large output of alloy steel... ..alloy steel is more expensive to produce than ordinary steel. So highly industrialized capitalist countries in peacetime make mostly ordinary steel and only a small per cent of alloy... However, the USSR...has a larger output of rolled

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alloy steel than the peacetime United States...In America, alloy steel is consumed primarily by the automobile industry... But, as already noted, the United States manufactures 12 times as many motor vehicles per year as the USSR. Obviously the Soviet auto industry can consume a relatively small proportion of the huge Russian production of alloy steel. Some is also used by the USSR tractor and electrical equipment industries, but the remainder has hardly any place to go except into armament industry, which must have very tough metal for its gun barrels, shell cases, tanks, and warships. A Soviet explanation of this industrial concentration follows:

'High-grade steels and electro-metallurgical alloys are being manufactured on a large scale. This enabled the USSR to expand its machinebuilding, airplane, auto and tractor industries, and to equip the heroic Red Army with the most up-to-date armaments, so it is ready to deal a crushing blow to any barbarous horde of Fascist bandits that might dare to encroach on Soviet territory.'

The Proportion of the Machine-building Industry.

"Still another disproportion, and one of monstrous size, is the stupenduous machine-building industry....By Soviet definition, machine-building includes the auto industry, aircraft manufacture, shipbuilding, machine-tool making, and the manufacture of all types of machines and their component parts: railway rolling stock, farm machines, motors, electrical gear, radios, ballbearings, watches, and so forth.

"Today, machine-building is the largest industry in the USSR. It constitutes almost half of all Soviet industry... In comparison, highly industrialized capitalist countries devote only one fifth or less of their total industry to machine-building... Of course, every American visiting Russia has noticed the dire need for machines in all fields of economy. Even today, mechanization of daily life in Russia is pitifully less than in America. In the land of the Soviets, most buildings are still painfully constructed inch-by-inch by hand, canals dug mostly by thousands of human shovelers, freight cars and ships loaded and unloaded on human backs.

The Convertibility of Industry

"...However, a huge machine-building industry is also a great military asset, since almost all types of engineering plants can be easily converted to war production. Russia's industrial experience during World War II illustrates this perfectly. The famous Soviet medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns were manufactured by tractor, auto, railway car, locomotive, and metallurgical machine-building and machine-tool factories, plus a river shipyard.almost every little machine shop in the USSR was shaping and grinding the casings for shells, bombs, and mines.

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"Of course, all industrialized countries make such factory conversion during wartime, but the important fact today is that half of all Soviet industry is machine-building, and thus potential armament industry. No capitalist country in the world has such a high proportion of convertible industry.

Peacetime Armament Production

"Even in peacetime, a large part of the USSR machine-building industry is devoted to armament production. According to the 1953 Soviet budget expenditures for military equipment and atomic research, approximately a huge one fifth of all Russian industry was devoted in 1953 to the production of military and naval equipment, as well as nuclear weapons for the armed forces. This does not include the production of uniforms and food for Soviet servicemen, nor the output of the fuel and raw material industries supplying the armament factories. In all, the USSR undoubtedly has the largest peacetime war production of any country in today's world.

"....Today, the all-important fact is that Soviet heavy industry has tripled its greatest wartime size. Therefore, with as complete conversion as in World War II, the USSR could manufacture three times as many munitions."

The National Budget of the USSR--

The following abstracts are taken from the unclassified US Department of the Army pamphlet, #20-65, March 1959, pp. 49-66.

The Soviet Budget is manipulated in order to minimize the vastness of military expenditures. An analysis of their military budget made in 1952 (Tairiku--The Continent, v. 1, No. 3, 31 Mar 52, pp. 31-35) showed that the Soviet Union's budget of that year was similar to the one during WW II despite the fact that during the war the consumption of arms and ammunition, and the cost of maintaining troops*was greater than in 1952. The analyst concluded that the USSR was earnestly engaged in war preparations.

"The Soviet Budget for 1955"

A later analysis, appearing in the "Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR," Bulletin (Munich, v. 2, no. 3, Mar 55, pp. 30-39) stated in summary:

"The second session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was convened as of 3 February 1955, with the budget of USSR for the current year as one of the main topics on the agenda. There were many speeches covering a

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wide field with a notable exception: there was no debate of the budget itself. Increases in the various expenditures of the 1955 budget as compared with the previous years had significance. The increase of expenditures for defense by 11.8 billion rubles may be the Soviet reply to the Paris agreements and the general consolidation of the Western Powers. In addition, there is reason to believe that the military expenditures of the USSR are not limited to the budget sums. The secret plan for developing agriculture in 1941, now in possession of the United States, shows that part of the resources designated for the production of arms and equipment for all three services was included in the budgets of the various Commissariats (ministries)."

Railway Development for Military Reasons

The third Soviet 5-year plan (1946-50) envisaged a capital expenditure of 50 billion rubles on the development of all forms of transport. (This is about 16 percent of all capital investments proposed by the plan.) New lines were developed mainly to safeguard the political and military predominance of the Soviet Union in southeastern and eastern Europe. ("Planned Railway Development in the Soviet Union," in Railway Gazette, v. 91, no. 21, 18 Nov 49, p. 581).

Similarly, the branch line constructed under Russia's fourth 5-year plan (south of the first trans-Siberian railroad between Kuibishev and Krasnoiarsk through Magnitigorsk, Akindinsk, Kalunda, and Stalinsk) was designed to permit a quick concentration of troops. ("Les Deux Transsiberiens; leur importance militaire" --The Military Importance of the Two Trans-Siberian Lines, in La Vie Militaire -- Military Life, v. 4 no. 37, 12 Sep 52, p. 5)

The growth of railways in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Western Siberia (by 1955) considerably exceeded economic requirements. The carefully conceived plan to develop transport communications in these regions had been based above all on strategic ground, and was only later supplemented by economic measures. The tremendous base for a Central Asian bridgehead created in Kazakhstan and western Siberia with its huge communications network permits the rapid concentration of forces and material resources sufficient not merely for defense but attack. ("Razvitie transportnykh svyazei Srednei Asii, Kazakhstan i Zapadnoi Sibiri"--The Development of Transport Communications in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Western Siberia, in the "Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, Journal, Munich, no. 16, Jul-Sep 55, pp. 21-38).

I. MILITARIZATION IN THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES

Jules Menken, a writer on world affairs who specializes in defense problems and Communist strategy, touches on the similarity between the militaristic posture of the Soviet Union and its satellites: Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The following excerpts are

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taken from his slim but useful little book, The Economics of Defence, London, Ampersand Ltd, 1955, pp. 57-63.

Resources in the Satellites

"The hundred million men, women and children who live in the seven Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe in an area totalling some 400,000 square miles--about the size of Britain, France, and Western Germany put together; or of the whole of Indo-China; or of Burma and Thailand combined--play an unsought and undesired part in the Soviet programme for creating Communist armed strength. Although these countries as a whole have an economy which is primarily agricultural, they also possess natural resources, and in some cases important industries.....Comparing the satellite targets with Soviet Five-Year Plan targets for 1955, the satellite coal and crude steel totals each represents over a third, and electricity nearly a half, of the corresponding Soviet goals. And to power and these basic materials the satellites add other important items: some uranium ore; the great Skoda armaments works in Czechoslovakia, the largest in Eastern Europe outside the Soviet Union; the varied and highly skilled industries of Eastern Germany, many of which provide technical products (such as optical glass, binoculars, and range-finders) essential to the conduct of modern war.

The Budgets of the Satellites

"As a consequence of the Communist system the satellite budgets also cover a larger proportion of their countries' economies than do budgets in the free world; and, because of Moscow's exactions, they impose a heavy burden on their peoples for 'defence.' Since 1948, moreover, the amounts so exacted have greatly increased--in Rumania, fourfold, in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria fivefold, in Poland sixfold, and in Hungary twelvefold....Taking economic resources and budgets together, it is thus clear that the satellite effort devoted on Moscow's demand to increasing aggregate Communist armaments is large. At realistic rates of exchange the 1953 'defence' budgets of the five countries listed...may be estimated at ...roughly two-thirds of the British defence outlay...in 1955-56. This is a very heavy burden for such poor countries.

Military Service in the Satellites

"In all the satellite countries the minimum period of military service is two years. In Poland the law provides for conscription of all men and women, with a basic period of between two and three years depending on the arm of service. In Czechoslovakia the Government by decree can alter the length of compulsory service, which a law of 1949 fixed at 24 months. In Hungary two years' service is extendible to three years. In

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Rumania the basic conscription period is three years, which may be served entirely in the armed forces (or, in certain cases, in labour units, or in both). Bulgaria also has conscription either to the armed forces or to labour units, with a basic period of two years for the Army, two and a half years for frontier troops, and up to four years for the Air Force and the Navy. In Albania the term of service is two years, three years, or four years for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy respectively.

Pre-Military and Para-Military Training

"In the East European satellite countries pre-military training and para-military activities after the Soviet pattern also prevail. In Eastern Germany three societies with innocuous or patriotic-sounding names--the 'Free German Youth' Movement, the 'Service for Germany' Movement, and the Society for 'Sport and Technology'--provide para-military training. In the 'Service for Poland' organisation--which all Poles aged 16 to 19 must join, youth and girls alike--the items of military instruction include basic infantry drill and rifle drill. The aims of the Czechoslovakia Youth Union include provision of the technical training required by tank and mechanised formations of the Army; other voluntary Czechoslovak 'people's' organisations--they include the Czechoslovak Red Cross, radio amateurs, carrier-pigeon breeders, and dog breeders--are responsible for para-military education and training over an only too obviously wide field. Hungary and Rumania boast so-called 'sports' organisations whose Soviet inspiration is clearly proclaimed in their names--'Ready to Work and Fight,' and 'Ready for Work and Defence'; while the Secretary-General of the Hungarian 'Freedom Fighters' Association' for both young people and adults has described it as the reserve of the Army."

Czechoslovakia: Sports as Paramilitary Training

The following is a translated excerpt from the article "Pourquoi l'URSS S'Arme-t-elle?" -- Why Does the USSR Arm Herself?-- in the Supplement to L'Economie-- Economics-- (v. 10, no. 461, 30 Sep 54):

"In a brochure published in 1953 in Czechoslovakia, entitled 'Zatopek,' they emphasize that Communist Party and Government interest is shown by the new law for physical education: 'There is being established a unified national organization as well as control of sports activities; the center of gravity of physical culture was transferred to the factories and schools, and the federation of labor unions (R.O.H.) became an important factor in the new organization of Czech sports, as in the tested model of Soviet sport. Czech athletes increasingly strengthen the link between sports and the construction of their Peoples Democracy; they constantly increase their capabilities in politics and in their work...; they dedicate themselves to raising their work skill and their preparation for defense...'

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"Another Czech publication [Czechoslovakia,] Orbis, Prague, 1953] is even more categorical: 'Physical education and sport have the aim of preparing the increasingly large mass of workers, peasants, and intellectuals to accomplish the goals set by the Communist Party and the Government, to cultivate among the youth and among the entire people the feeling of socialist patriotism and the enthusiasm for the defense of their Peoples Democracy.'"